The notion of faith has been variously understood—and misunderstood—throughout the course of Christian intellectual history. Recently, there has been renewed interest in thinking carefully about faith, which has produced a spate of philosophical and analytic theological work on its nature. Though these projects have produced very good work, faith continues to be variously understood. It is common for an account of faith, especially Christian faith, to see certain beliefs as necessary ingredients of faith or to see faith as, in some way, propositional. In this paper, I argue that faith, especially faith that’s had in the context of relationships, is nonpropositional. Instead, I argue that faith is, at bottom, an act of ventured trust. This is not to say that beliefs and the evidence for the truth of our beliefs are unimportant. Indeed, I argue that having evidence that counts in favor of faith is what makes faith a moral good.

Theists typically believe that God knows all truths. However, accounts of divine omniscience almost always focus on the scope of God’s knowledge or perhaps on whether certain kinds of facts are there to be known by God, such as counterfactuals of creaturely freedom or future contingent facts. Very rarely do these accounts include for analysis the nature of God’s knowledge. In this paper, I develop an acquaintance theory of God’s knowledge where acquaintance with an epistemic relation that guarantees the truth of God’s beliefs is necessary for knowledge. I argue that this view achieves an ideal way of knowing, worthy of the divine being.